Which firms use Islamic financing?  by Minhat, Marizah & Dzolkarnaini, Nazam
Economics Letters 150 (2017) 15–17Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Which firms use Islamic financing?
Marizah Minhat a, Nazam Dzolkarnaini b,∗
a The Business School, Edinburgh Napier University, United Kingdom
b Salford Business School, University of Salford, United Kingdom
h i g h l i g h t s
• We study the use of Islamic financing instruments (IFIs) by non-financial firms.
• IFIs form a significant share of the users’ capital structures.
• Less profitable firms use more debt than equity which is largely made up of IFIs.
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a b s t r a c t
This study explores to what extent the Islamic financing instruments are used by non-financial firms.
Based on a panel data of firms from fourteen developing countries for the 2005–2009 period, we find that
Islamic financing forms a significant share of the users’ capital structures. Less profitable firms are found
more likely to use debt than equity in which case Islamic instruments were preferred over conventional
debt. The finding suggests that Islamic financing does benefit less profitable firms, which is consistent
with the agency cost perspective.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Research about corporate financing has flourished since
the infamous proposition of capital structure irrelevance by
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Significant progress has been made
to understand the determinants of financing choice, which has
resulted in voluminous empirical evidence that tested various
capital structure theories such as agency theory (Jensen, 1986),
trade-off theory and pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and
Myers, 1999). In essence, the theories attempted to explain factors
that could plausibly influence the use of internal funds (i.e., profits)
and external funds (i.e., debt and equity) in corporate financing.
However, our understanding of corporate financing decisions
remains incomplete, particularly in respect of the use of Islamic
financing instruments (referred to as IFIs hereafter). There is a
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unable to explain the economic rationale of why firms use IFIs
to finance their activities. This gap has to be addressed given the
fact that Islamic finance industry remains buoyant even during
the recent economic slowdown.1 Our study aims to fill this gap.
We conjecture that religion is not the sole factor that influences
the decision to use IFIs in corporate financing. We offer plausible
economic rationale for this financing behaviour. The insight offered
in this study provides an important foundation for future research
on corporate financing.
Theoretically, due to the prohibition of interest on debt and
promotion of profit and loss sharing, IFIs should possess attributes
that are distinguishable from conventional financing instruments
(Ayub, 2007). The distinctive nature of Islamic financing invokes
a question on whether the decision to use IFIs will be influenced
by similar set of factors that influence the use of conventional
1 Financial Times (12 May 2011).
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Sample distribution by country, data availability, and the use of IFIs (2005–2009).
No. Country No. of firms with annual reports available (2005–2009) No. of firms with IFIs Percentage (%)
1 Bahrain 3 0 0
2 Bangladesh 9 0 0
3 Egypt 9 1 11
4 Indonesia 16 4 25
5 Jordan 3 0 0
6 Kuwait 9 2 22
7 Malaysia 20 13 65
8 Mauritius 9 0 0
9 Pakistan 14 4 29
10 Palestine 2 0 0
11 Qatar 16 4 25
12 Saudi Arabia 6 4 67
13 Tunisia 1 0 0
14 UAE 12 4 33
Total 129 36 28instruments. To answer this question, we test whether the usual
firm-specific factors, namely, profitability, growth opportunities,
collateral, size and liquidity influence the use of IFIs by firms.
First, we find that Islamic financing forms a significant
proportion of users’ capital structures. Second, less profitable
firms and those with greater growth opportunities are associated
with greater use of debt as measured by leverage (i.e., long-
term debt over equity), which is consistent with the pecking
order theory. This suggests that firms attract debt over equity
due to greater asymmetric information as proxied by growth
opportunities and the shortage of internal funds (i.e., profitability).
Thirdly, profitability is significantly related to the decision to
use Islamic financing, in which less profitable firms have more
proportion of IFIs instead of conventional debt in their capital
structures. Islamic financing attracts less profitable firms due
to the presence of adverse selection amongst Islamic financiers,
who may discount the agency cost of financing to survive within
their restricted investment universe (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000;
Godlewski et al., 2013).
2. Sample and data
The sample is consisted of large firms from fourteen developing
countries that have non-negligible presence of Islamic banks:
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates and Palestine. The corporate firms in these countries may
have greater incentives to use Islamic financing due to the ready
demand to invest in IFIs created by the Islamic financiers there.
The data on IFIs were gathered from the annual reports of the
firms for the period 2005–2009. The firms were the top twenty
constituents of the main stock market index of each country. The
sample excludes financial firms.
As reported in Table 1, annual reports were available for 129
firms. IFIswere used by firms in fifty seven percent (i.e., 8/14) of the
sample countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, UAE, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt.
Firms’ preference for using debt over equity to finance their
operations is measured by the ratio of the book value of long-term
debt to total equity (de Jong et al., 2008). This leverage ratio is
set as the dependent variable when testing the influence of firm-
specific factors on the preference to use debt over equity. To study
the determinants of Islamic financing among firms, the ratio of
long-term IFIs to long-term debt is used as the dependent variable.
This ratio reflects the extent of firms’ preference for using IFIs over
conventional debt to finance their operations.
Profitability is measured as the earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation and amortisation divided by the total assets (Bevan
and Danbolt, 2004). The firm’s market-to-book ratio is a commonvariable used to proxy for growth opportunities. It is defined as
the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity to the book value of
equity. It contains the highest information content with respect to
investment opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2008). Tangibility is
defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets (net of accumulated
depreciation) to the firm’s book value of total assets. It measures
the firm’s collateral level. Liquidity is the firm’s current ratio which
is measured as the current assets divided by the current liabilities.
Firm size is measured as the natural log of total sales.
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study
are presented in Table 2. As reported in Table 2, the average
leverage (i.e., long-term debt over equity) of firms is 85%, which
is surprisingly high. By comparison, the average presence of IFIs
on the users’ capital structures is substantial, which is 28% of their
total equity. The average ratio of IFIs to total debt is even higher,
which is 46%.
3. Empirical analysis and results
Unbalanced panel regression models were used to test the
determinants of conventional debt and IFIs usage among firms.
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) argue that the empirical evidence on
capital structure determinants based on pooled cross-sectional
regressions may be biased due to their failure to control for
firm-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity. A formal Hausman
specification test for fixed versus random effects panel estimation
was used to identify the estimation method which is suitable for
each financial policy measure.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the results for conventional
debt determinants whereby a leverage ratio is used as the
dependent variable. The profitability coefficients across two
different regressionmodels are negative and significant, which are
consistent with the prediction of pecking order theory (Myers and
Majluf, 1984). The shortage of internal funds (i.e., profitability)may
signal greater uncertainty about a firm’s prospect for solvency,
hence is likely to attract higher agency cost of equity. Therefore,
debt is preferred to minimise the agency cost of financing. Debt
is also preferred by firms with greater growth opportunities that
suffer from greater information asymmetry about their future cash
flows. This argument is consistent with the observed significant
positive relationship between leverage and growth opportunities.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the significance of
profitability on the firm’s decision to use Islamic financing. Both
fixed-effects and random-effects reveal consistent results that
suggest profitability affects the decision to use IFIs. The negative
relationship between IFIs and profitability suggests that less
profitable firms are more likely to have greater proportion of IFIs
on their capital structures.
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Descriptive statistics of variables.
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
Leverage variables
Long-term debt/equity 0.85 0.62 0.92 0 5.72 2.40 10.70
Long-term IFIs/equity 0.28 0.10 0.41 0 1.61 2.00 5.91
Long-term IFIs/long-term debt 0.46 0.27 1.19 0 1.00 8.74 83.43
Explanatory variables
Profitability 0.12 0.11 0.08 −0.15 0.33 −0.21 4.55
Liquidity 1.76 1.54 0.94 0.17 5.58 1.42 5.72
Growth opportunities 2.24 1.96 1.54 0.24 8.47 1.74 6.77
Collateral 0.41 0.47 0.25 0.01 0.90 −0.22 1.96
Size (ln sales) 20.36 20.32 1.74 14.92 24.42 −0.33 3.98Table 3
Panel data results for the determinants of the use of debt and IFIs.
Explanatory variables Long-term debt/equity Long-term IFIs/long-term debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
Profitability −2.19** −2.43** −6.35** −6.30***
(−1.97) (−2.40) (−2.30) (−3.73)
Growth opportunities 0.17*** 0.18*** −0.11 0.05
(3.05) (3.49) (−0.78) (0.60)
Collateral 0.04 0.56 −0.08 0.32
(0.05) (1.12) (−0.04) (0.70)
Size 0.44*** 0.10 0.09 −0.01
(2.69) (1.35) (0.22) (−0.03)
Liquidity 0.07 −0.05 −0.41 −0.16
(0.57) (−0.49) (−1.26) (−1.31)
Constant −8.30** −1.50 0.39 1.27
(−2.48) (−1.00) (0.05) (0.91)
Joint test statistic (regression) 3.03** 17.06*** 2.82** 21.32***
Corr (µi, x) −0.63 0.00 −0.39 0.00
F-statistic (all µi = 0) 7.98*** – 0.76 –
Hausman test FE vs. RE (χ2) 21.95*** – 4.17 –
R2within 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.15
R2between 0.02 0.25 0.13 0.26
R2overall 0.01 0.15 0.14 0.19
t-statistics in parentheses for fixed effects and z-statistics in parentheses for random effects model. Joint test statistic for fixed effects is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for
random effects model is the Wald χ2 .
** Indicate statistical significance at 5% level, (2-tail test).
*** Indicate statistical significance at 1% level, (2-tail test).4. Conclusions
The preference for IFIs over conventional debt amongst less
profitable firms is consistent with the notion that IFIs attract
cheaper source of financing due to the ready demand created
by the restricted Islamic financial market to lend or invest only
according to Sharia’ (Godlewski et al., 2013). Godlewski et al.
(2013) argue that less profitable firms may prioritise IFIs over
conventional debt financing because the former can be viewed
as more accessible and advantageous form of financing that
attracts lower agency cost of financing in the presence of high
demand for IFIs from less-diversified Islamic financiers. Also,
financing less profitable firms may be a second-best solution for
Islamic financiers who are under constant need to justify their
existence and operations through consecutive investments in IFIs.
While conventional financiers would generally turn down less
profitable firms, Islamic financiers who are subject to adverse
selection problems may lend to such firms. It is not impossible
for the borrowing firms to divert funds or invest in high-cost
investment projects that would reduce profitability (Aggarwal and
Yousef, 2000). This argument suggests that Islamic financiers may
have underestimated the agency cost of financing, which can be
detrimental in the absence of proper risk management.
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